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Abstract
We attempt a connection between three entities: Extreme Stock Market Returns, the Web Attention
factor and a set of News Flow factors, for three groups of countries during the European Financial
Crisis: the Euro-periphery countries, the Euro-core countries, and the major European Union -but
not euro- countries. Using daily stock market data from January 2004 till March 2013 and textual
analysis on more than 24,000 news articles from seven leading international news providers, we
find that the Euro-periphery Web Attention (SVI) and News Flow variables significantly affect the
probabilities of extreme bottom returns for the Euro-periphery, the Non-euro and the Euro-core
groups. More Web Attention and more bad news for the Euro-periphery in times of crisis are
associated with higher probabilities of extreme bottom returns within and across groups.
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1. Introduction
One topic that dominated the financial press over the past few years has undoubtedly been the
Euro-crisis. At the center of the Euro-crisis were the Euro-periphery countries (Portugal, Ireland,
Italy, Greece, Spain), whose vulnerabilities led to bailout packages, either at the sovereign or the
banking level. Scores of news stories were written on whether these countries could make it or not,
how bad their finances and how uncompetitive they were, whether they should part ways with the
common currency area, and whether bad news about them might propagate and affect the rest of the
European countries, causing a domino effect.
Classic asset pricing theory uses financial factors to price assets. But the original source of the
markets’ reactions and hence of the crisis spillover must be traced to relevant information about
the underlying financial entities, and the way investors process and interpret the content of this
information. Previous research regarding news and events concerning the Euro-crisis mainly dealt
with the impact of official news announcements such as sovereign debt rating changes, using dummy
variables to denote the occurrence of events, or arbitrarily defining events and news as ”good” or
”bad” (e.g. Arezki, Candelon, and Sy (2011), Beetsma, Giuliodori, de Jong, and Widijanto (2013),
Mink and De Haan (2013)). Nevertheless, such specific announcements give at best a partial and at
worst a biased view of the impact of information on market prices since they do not reflect all available
news and in many cases they are anticipated by market participants. Classifying events arbitrarily is
problematic because it depends entirely on the perceptions and beliefs of the researcher(s) who classify
the news, while it also neglects the degree of negative (or positive, or uncertain) information, dealing
only with the extreme parts of the sentiment spectrum, and completely ignoring all values in between.
One can conjecture that changes in relevant information flows is one of the significant factors that
affect stock prices. Obtaining usable indicators of information flows and their sentiment and relating
them directly to the market returns is the focus of this paper. We attempt to shed light on the impact
of two main information sources on market prices and crisis transmission; the News Flow imbedded
in newspaper articles and newswires, and investors’ attention about the crisis captured by their Web
search activities. The main contributions of this paper are the following: first, we incorporate a broad
selection of news sources and we use a rather elaborate method to select news items relevant for the
topic of the Euro-crisis under investigation; second, we develop and test different metrics of news
relevance; third, we specifically examine the impact of News Flow (and Web Attention) about the
peripheral countries on their own stock markets as well as on the stock markets of other European
countries; This way we answer the question of whether after all the Euro-periphery financial sentiment
does indeed significantly affect the other countries financial asset returns, which is the main concern
of financial discussions and policy making since the advent of the Euro-crisis.
We find that the News Flow and Web Attention about the financial crisis significantly affect not
only the Euro-periphery but also the Euro-core and the Non-euro country groups. During the Euro-
crisis higher values for the News Flow and Web Attention factors about the Euro-periphery crisis are
associated with higher probabilities of extreme bottom returns for all three country groups.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the related textual analysis and Web
Attention literature. Section 3 presents the data and the model specification. The empirical findings
are shown in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 provides a set of robustness and alternative specifications
and Section 6 concludes.
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2. Related Literature
The study of News Flow has attracted the researchers’ interest rather recently with the advent of
Data Mining and Sentiment Analysis techniques. The strong interest in this area has been demon-
strated by the recent creation of companies and commercial products specialized in the production
of financial sentiment (see e.g., RavenPack1 and Thomson Reuters News Analytics2). As far as the
finance literature is concerned, the pioneering work of Tetlock (2007) uses textual analysis (based
on the Harvard psychosocial dictionary) of a Wall Street Journal column, and associates the content
of the news with the Dow Jones returns, using vector autoregressions (VARs). He finds that media
pessimism has predictive power on market returns, while reversion effects occur and extreme absolute
values of pessimism predict higher trading volumes. Loughran and McDonald (2011) develop finance-
oriented word lists by fine-tuning the Harvard dictionary, and correlate textual analysis variables with
stock returns, volatility and trading volume after 10-K filings dates. Other studies report evidence
of predictive power of stock message boards and major financial columns on volatility, returns and
volume (Antweiler and Frank (2004), Chen, De, Hu, and Hwang (2013)). The related literature also
studies the effect of returns on media content Garcıa (2012), the effect of media content on returns
during recessions and expansions (Garcia (2013)), while a high level of similarity in firm-specific news
is found to provoke higher trading aggressiveness of individual investors (Tetlock (2011)). Boudoukh,
Feldman, Kogan, and Richardson (2013) find that news that can be identified and classified in certain
categories have a higher impact on stock markets than unidentified news. Another area of research
has been the field of corporate earnings, where Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008) find
that a higher percentage of negative words in news about specific firms predicts lower quarterly earn-
ings. Furthermore, textual analysis has been used for the study of initial public offerings (IPOs).
Loughran and McDonald (2013) find that higher uncertainty in filings affect first-day returns and ex
post volatility, Jegadeesh and Wu (2013) give different weights on words based on the market reac-
tions that they caused and Li (2010) studies the effect of forward-looking statements in corporate
filings on future earnings and liquidity. Chouliaras (2015c) studies the effect of newswire intraday
high-frequency (30-minutes) news on international stock markets during the European financial crisis.
Ahern and Sosyura (2014) show evidence of firms manipulating media coverage to achieve better stock
prices during mergers and acquisitions negotiations. Chouliaras (2015b) finds that monthly portfolios
based on the product of annual pessimism change and the previous period returns generate returns in
excess of previous winners/losers. Finally, Chouliaras (2015a) finds that 10-K pessimism negatively
affects stock holdings after the filing, while institutions do not appear to have forecasting power as to
how pessimistic the annual report will be.
As far as the Web Attention literature is concerned, Varian and Choi (2009) use the Google
Trends Search Volume Index (SVI) to forecast economic indicators, such as car sales and unemploy-
ment claims3. Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) find that a higher SVI for stocks in Russell 3000
forecasts higher returns in the next two weeks, an effect which reverses within one year. Da, Engel-
berg, and Gao (2015) use queries that may concern households, such as “recession”, “unemployment”,
“bankruptcy” and create an investor sentiment index which can forecast return reversals, volatility
spikes and mutual fund movements from the stock to the bond market.
Regarding financial returns, we use the approach proposed by Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) and
1http://www.ravenpack.com/
2http://www.machinereadablenews.com/
3Google Trends can be found at: http://www.google.com/trends/explore#cmpt=q
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Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2010) who examine the coincidence of extreme return shocks across groups
of countries. A number of authors have used this methodology4. We mostly study extreme returns
days, because these are the days where the biggest potential losses (and gains) occur for investors, and
this is where one would expect the effects to be most powerful. Nevertheless, our findings are robust
even when taking all days into account in a regression framework.
Our study is related to Tetlock (2007), Garcia (2013) and Garcıa (2012) as far as the analysis
of News Flow is concerned and to Da et al. (2015) regarding the Web Attention (SVI). The main
contributions to the previous literature are: first and foremost, we employ a database of over 24,000
news articles from some of the biggest international news sources. We perform a cross-media analysis
since we take into account all relevant news items from the entire news sources selected, while the
previous studies typically use one or two columns from one or two newspapers; second, we study local
and cross-country effects, while the previous literature mainly deals with the effects of specific financial
columns on the US stock exchange; third, we investigate the interplay between financial returns, News
Flow and Web Attention (SVI). Blending these research strands allows interesting new insights about
the generation and the impact of new information. Since it is well accepted that the most vulnerable
eurozone countries -the Euro-periphery group- were the most badly hit by the Euro-crisis, our main
interest is to study for the crisis transmission from the Euro-periphery group to the other two groups
(Euro-periphery vs. Euro-core, Euro-periphery vs. Non-euro). Additional questions that we are ad-
dressing include: Is it the news media and their tone that draws the attention of individuals, or is
the Web Attention (SVI) that precedes and then the media catch up with the stories? Do financial
returns lead or lag the News Flow and the Web Attention (SVI) factors? Or are these three entities
inseparably intertwined, where each of them provides feedback loops and affects the other two?
3. The Data
The main area of study for this paper is the European Union area. Thus, we create three country
groups: the Euro-periphery group contains the periphery eurozone countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy,
Greece, Spain), the Euro-core group contains the core countries of the Eurozone (Germany, France, the
Netherlands, Finland, Belgium), and the Non-euro group contains the major European Union (but not
Euro) countries (Poland, Sweden, Czech Republic, UK, Denmark)5. The rationale behind these three
groups is the following: the Euro-periphery group consists of the five Eurozone countries that were
most severly hit during the Euro-crisis. The Euro-core group consists of the biggest countries (in terms
of market capitalisation) that are member-countries of the Eurozone. The last group, the Non-euro
group, consists of countries that are not part of the Eurozone, but are part of the European Union,
which is a major trade union, with free movement of capital and individuals throughout all member
states. We want to examine the three groups separately because they may have different degrees of
integration and dependence among them. We examine the period from 01/01/2004 till 13/03/2013
using daily financial data obtained from the Thomson Reuters Datastream, News Flow data from Dow
Jones Factiva and Web Attention data from the Google Trends. We also split our sample in three
subperiods (Pre-crisis, US-crisis and Euro-crisis) to be able to make comparisons between normal and
abnormal times in the financial markets:
4See, for example, Christiansen and Ranaldo (2009), Gropp, Duca, and Vesala (2009), Chouliaras and Grammatikos
(2015).
5We take the biggest five stock markets from each group using the market capitalisation ranking (as of 2011) from
http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD/rankings
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• the Pre-crisis period (from 1 January 2004 till 26 February 2007)
• the US-crisis period (from 27 February 2007 till 7 December 2009).6
• the Euro-crisis period (from 8 December 2009 till the end of our sample period, 13 March 2013).
On 27 February 2007, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) announced that it
will no longer buy the most risky subprime mortgages and mortgage-related securities. On 8 December
2009, the Greek debt was downgraded by Fitch from A- to BBB+, with a negative outlook.
3.1. News Flow and Web Attention (SVI)
One can conjecture that changes in relevant information flows is one of the significant factors that
affect stock prices. Obtaining usable indicators of information flows and their sentiment about the
evolving Euro-crisis and relating them directly to the market returns is the focus of this paper.
We extract and analyse from Dow Jones Factiva7 news articles covering the test period from
January 1st, 2004 till March 13th, 2013. We collect news articles from seven sources: Dow Jones
Newswires, Thomson Reuters, Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, The
Telegraph and The Times. We use these seven sources because first of all they returned the greatest
number of news items for our queries and secondly because they are undoubtedly among the most
popular news sources worldwide. Dow Jones Newswires and Thomson Reuters give news items in
newswires form, capturing news in real time. The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times are
the main points of reference from the United States, and The Financial Times, The Telegraph and The
Times are the main European news papers for the financial markets. We include both content from
the print and the online editions (where available) from all our seven sources. For each Euro-periphery
country the relevant stories are obtained by a query searching for news that include the name of the
country plus one of the following terms each time: crisis, debt, economy, deficit, default. For example,
for Greece the news were retrieved by searching for news stories containing any of the terms:
• “greek crisis”
• “greek debt”
• “greek economy”
• “greek deficit”
• “greek default”
The same applies to all five Euro-periphery countries. The importance of these search terms in the
period examined is obvious and follows closely the search terms used in Google Trends (see below).
A news item that contains the term Greek crisis is certainly related to the crisis in Greece. “Greek
debt” is relevant since the european crisis is also a debt crisis. The search term “greek economy” is
included in order to capture the stories about the nation’s economy. The “greek deficit” component
is included since a lot of discussion is made around the deficits of the countries and the deficit is
obviously one of the main factors to assess the financial performance of a nation. Finally, the “greek
default” component captures the sovereign default risk debate, since the fear of countries defaulting
elevated at various time points during the crisis. These five search terms were also found to be the
most relevant key words used in Google searches.
6We use 27 February 2007 as the start of the financial crisis, as used by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in
their Timeline of Events and Policy Actions. The timeline can be found at http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.
cfm?p=timeline.
7Dow Jones Factiva can be found in http://www.dowjones.com/factiva/index.asp
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3.1.1. Preprocessing the news data
These selection criteria result in a total of 110,800 news articles. As a first step we exclude
duplicate articles that can reach very high numbers. Especially in newswires (Dow Jones Newswires
and Thomson Reuters), it is very common that the same (or highly similar) pieces of information are
redistributed, even up to ten times or more. This can cause problems since there is the possibility
that a small number of news dominates the news sample, simply because it is being delivered multiple
times, with none (or insignificant) changes. Furthermore, newspapers have print and online editions
(which we both take into account), and it is very common that the same information is first uploaded
on the Web (online edition), and then printed on the regular newspaper edition. Another problem
that this repeated information can cause is that information that is available on the Web at day t,
might be released at the press edition at time t+1. But in reality, this information belongs to time
t, not at both time periods. Moreover, various news sources (such as the Wall Street Journal) have
multiple editions (WSJ US, WSJ Asia, WSJ Europe). Many times the same information is published
in these editions, even with different dates, since the time zone differences can be quite significant.
Thus, since we want to study the unique impact of information at the day it was first released, we
keep the news item published first and discard all duplicates after the distribution of the first news
item. For each country, for the subset of news that are timestamped, we keep the news that were
released until the stock market was operating on that day. If a news item was released after the stock
market has closed for the day, we set the day of this news item to t+1, because the effect of this news
on the stock market will at best be at t+1. After this preprocessing step, the number of news articles
falls to 58,741.
3.1.2. Keywords in titles as a determinant of news items relevance
Another issue of concern has to do with the fact that news items that contain a set of keywords,
do not necessarily concern only this topic. This is true especially for newswires. Very often multiple
pieces of information are released through newswires in the same news item, covering multiple topics,
each one of them occupying no more than a few lines of the overall news item. To deal with this
problem, we select only items that contain one or more of a set of keywords in their title since the
title is perhaps the best signal of the article content. The title keywords for Greece are the following:
“greece”, “greece’s”, “greek”, “greeks”, “hellas”, “hellenic”. Similar keywords are used for the other
four Euro-periphery countries. After these preprocessing steps are applied, the news sources and the
total number of news items appear in Table 1, having a total of 24,402 news items:
Insert Table 1 here
We see from Table 1 that Pre-crisis most news are about Italy and Spain, but in the Euro-crisis
period most news concern Greece. Most news overall are obtained from the newswires (Dow Jones and
Thomson Reuters: 6,536 and 6,609 respectively out of a total of 18,786 news articles in the Euro-crisis).
One can easily notice that the amount of news surrounding each country increased dramatically from
the Pre-crisis to the Euro-crisis periods. For example, there were a total of 307 articles regarding
Greece in the Pre-crisis period, and this number jumped to 11,483 for the Euro-crisis period.
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3.1.3. Textual Analysis and Web Attention (SVI)
Using textual analysis, based on the Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary8, we measure
the positive media content as in Garcıa (2012) and Garcia (2013): Gt =
∑
i
git
wit
, calculated as the
percentage of positive words over the total number of words of day t. The symbol git stands for the
number of positive words in all relevant articles on day t, and wit stands for the total number of words
in all relevant articles on day t. We do the same for the negative words, obtaining the negative media
content as Bt =
∑
i
bit
wit
, with bit denoting the negative words in all articles of day t. Thus, we obtain
the Pessimism on day t as the difference between the negative and the positive media measures:
Pessimismt = Bt −Gt (1)
The Pessimism is calculated for every Euro-periphery country, for every day. Then, the Euro-periphery
Pessimism (Pt) is calculated as the average of the Euro-periphery pessimism factors on every day:
Pt =
5∑
j=1
Pessimismj,t
5
(2)
where Pessimismj,t is the pessimism factor for the Euro-periphery country j (j takes values 1 to 5, one
for each of the Euro-periphery countries).
A second way to measure news pessimism is by calculating the Weighted Pessimism (WPt), defined
as the weighted average of the pessimism of the five Euro-periphery countries:
WPt =
5∑
j=1
Pessimismj,tNj,t
5∑
j=1
Nj,t
(3)
where Nj,t stands for the number of relevant news (on day t) for country j.
Another metric we use is the News Count (Nt) which is the total number of articles written in a
day regarding any of the Euro-periphery countries.
During the Pre-crisis period, the average pessimism of news was 0.399%, while the weighted pes-
simism was 1.067%. To account for the fact that news stories tend to measure higher on pessimism
even during normal periods, we estimate another metric, which we call the Abnormal Pessimism
Count (APt) which measures the number of articles for all Euro-periphery countries with a pessimistic
content which is higher than the Pre-crisis average pessimistic content (0.399%). A final metric is the
Abnormal Weighted Pessimism Count (AWPt) where instead of the Pre-crisis pessimism, we use the
Pre-crisis Weighted pessimism (1.067%) as a threshold to count the number of pessimistic news.
Finally, we attempt a connection between the financial data and the investor attention as measured
by the search frequency of Google Trends via the Search Volume Index (SVI). Google Trends provides
weekly (and for some frequent terms daily) time series that depict how much a key term (or terms)
was searched for via the Google Search Engine for a certain period of time. Our SVI data are daily,
since the crisis queries were searched in high volumes during the crisis periods. Google is by far the
most popular search engine in the world, with an 88.8% market share as of June 20139. Thus, it is
8The dictionary can be found at http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html
9Source: http://www.karmasnack.com/about/search-engine-market-share/
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safe to assume that it captures the worlwide interest of the (Internet) population as measured by the
searches the individuals perform worldwide. Moreover, as mentioned in Da et al. (2011), when someone
searches for something on Google (be it a stock, a bond or information about the crisis), he certainly
is interested in it. Thus, Google Trends provide a direct measure of Web Attention. Especially in
crisis times, one could argue that the SVI can capture the uncertainty and the interest over topics
and issues that trouble the markets and the nations and attract the investors’ interest worldwide. We
hasten to add, however, that the information about the SVI itself is not publicly available in real time.
Investors can know about it only with a time delay. The Google Trends SVI is:
Web Search Volume Index: SV Ijt = k, k = 0, ..., 100 (4)
SV Ijt is a scaled time series taking a discrete value (0 to 100) for time t (0 meaning the query was not
searched at all on time t, and a 100 when it was most searched for in the given time frame), based on
the number of searches made via the Google Search Engine for a specific query and time period, with
j once more taking values 1 to 5 for each one of the five Euro-periphery countries. We then calculate
the average SVI for the five (5) Euro-periphery countries. Depending on the popularity of the query,
Google Trends provides a time series of monthly (least searched), weekly, or daily (most searched)
frequency. If a query is not searched enough for Google’s threshold, no results are returned for this
period10. Since we are mainly interested in the Euro-crisis period, and especially the Euro-periphery
countries, we decided to proceed with the same sets of key search terms that we used in our News
Flow analysis before, each one corresponding to a country11,12.
Table 2 summarizes the News Flow and Web Attention (SVI) variable definitions:
Insert Table 2 here
The graphical illustrations for the SVI for Greece appears in Figure 1:
Insert Figure 1 here
One can clearly see that there are time periods where the Web Attention spikes, in other words
periods where people were searching a lot in the Web (via the Google Search Engine) using Greek
crisis related queries.
The summary statistics for the News Flow and Web attention factors for the Pre-crisis, the US-
crisis and the Euro-crisis subperiods appear in Table 3:
Insert Table 3 here
10The maximum time period for which daily data can be obtained by Google Trends is three months for each query.
And every Google Trends time series returned is scaled with the maximum value for the specified timeperiod. For this
reason, we scaled all three months time intervals for each country with a common scaling factor which was the day with
the most searches in the entire time period, thus obtaining a homogenized scaling for the entire period.
11For each query, for example “Greek crisis”, Google Trends provides 5 related search terms and their popularity. The
choice of the 5 terms used in Google Trends and the News Flow was partially influenced by this popularity. Moreover
the syntax of the Google queries was modified slightly also in function of their popularity. For example we used “Greece
crisis” instead of “Greek crisis”, because “Greece crisis” was much more searched for. Of course the two queries are
referring to the same entities and thus it is safe to claim the two queries are equivalent.
12No daily data were available for these search queries for the Pre-crisis and the US-crisis period, thus the SVI analysis
is done only for the Euro-crisis period.
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We notice that the News Flow factors significantly increase from the Pre-crisis to the Euro-crisis
period. More specifically, the mean value of the Pessimism factor increased from 0.399% Pre-crisis
to the value of 1.574% in the Euro-crisis period. As far as the News Count factor is concerned, it
increased from an average of 3.279 Euro-periphery articles per day during the Pre-crisis period to an
average of 22.093 articles per day during the Euro-crisis period.
3.2. Stock Returns and Extreme Returns
We employ the classical measures of stock returns, but we mostly focus on extreme stock returns
as a measure better tailored to capture ”exceptional” performance typical in a financial crisis. Table
4 shows the summary statistics of the percentage (%) log-returns of the major stock market country
indices13.
Insert Table 4 here
For the Pre-crisis period all groups of countries had positive mean stock returns, consistent with
the overall optimism in the financial markets. The best performing markets were firstly the Non-euro
countries (+0.101%) followed by the Euro-periphery countries (+0.089%). Regarding the standard
deviation we see that we have rather low values for all country groups as this was a period of relative
calmness for the financial markets. During the US-crisis period all country groups had a negative
mean return. The Euro-periphery countries were the most badly hit with a mean (daily) return of
-0.074%, followed by the Euro-core countries which had a mean (daily) return of -0.049%, then the
Non-euro with a -0.024%. Compared to the Pre-crisis period, the standard deviations have increased
significantly in the crisis periods for all three country groups. The descriptive statistics for the Euro-
crisis period show that once more the Euro-periphery countries were the most severely affected from
the financial crisis (mean daily return of −0.017%). The other two groups have positive mean returns
for this period, indicating that they were able to better cope with the crisis. The standard deviations
were lower than in the US-crisis period but still higher than the Pre-crisis period, especially for the
Euro-periphery group.
The correlations among the information variables and the country group stock indices appear in
Table 5.
Insert Table 5 here
There exist some significant changes when comparing the three subperiods. The correlations
among the stock indexes of the three country groups generally increased during the US-crisis period,
declined slightly in the Euro-crisis period but remained at higher levels than the Pre-crisis period. The
correlations between the information variables and the group stock returns Pre-crisis were small (and
positive for the Euro-core and the Non-euro groups) during the US-crisis and the Euro-crisis periods
almost all correlations become negative and much larger in magnitude. For example, the correlation
between the Weighted Pessimism and the Euro-core group, has a value of 0.003 in the Pre-crisis
period. This value becomes 0.008 in the US-crisis period, but becomes negative and equal to -0.06
in the Euro-crisis period. The SVI is also negatively correlated with all three group stock indexes
during the Euro-crisis period. As a matter of fact, all correlations of the information variables with
13All stock indices used are the Thomson Reuters Datastream indices created for each country
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the stock markets are negative during the Euro-crisis period, which indicates that higher news flow
values during the Euro-crisis period were associated with negative stock market returns for all three
country groups14. Naturally, the information variables are quite significantly (positively) correlated
among themselves.
3.2.1. Extreme Returns
According to Bae et al. (2003) an extreme return is one that lies below (or above) the lowest (or the
highest) quantile of the marginal return distribution respectively. The method deals with the counts
of joint occurrences of extreme returns within a group on a particular day. The original approach
studies the extreme returns counts for the entire test period, taking as thresholds for extreme returns
the 5th and the 95th percentiles. In our case, since we are mostly interested in the dynamics in the
Pre-crisis and the Euro-crisis periods, we choose as thresholds the 10th and the 90th percentiles in
order to have a sufficient number of observations, as in Boyson et al. (2010) (our findings are robust
to the 5th and 95th percentiles). For each country we consider returns below the 10th percentile as
extreme bottom returns and those above the 90th percentile as extreme top returns for this country.
This procedure is followed for all countries in all groups. Top extreme returns are treated separately
from bottom extreme returns. Bottom and top extreme returns counts for the entire period (1/1/2004-
13/3/2013) are reported in Table 6. For each country we calculate the days for which it had an extreme
(bottom or top) return separately. Then, the extreme returns count for each group and day is given
as the number of countries of the group that have extreme returns on that specific day.
Insert Table 6 here
The left side of Table 6 presents bottom return counts and the right side shows top return counts.
A count of i units for bottom returns is the joint occurrence of i extreme bottom returns on a particular
day for a specific group. By counting the total number of days with extreme returns of a given count
and identifying which countries participate in those events and how often we have a good overview of
the extreme returns for each country and group of countries.
The Greek stock market had the most days (106) on which it was the only country experiencing a
bottom extreme return, followed by Ireland (56 days) and Portugal (37 days). A total of 54 days are
reported for the Euro-periphery countries on which all of them experienced extreme bottom returns
(109 days for the Euro-core, 55 days for the Non-euro). There were 40 days where all Euro-periphery
countries experienced an extreme top return (91 days for the Euro-core, 28 days for the Non-euro).
The Czech Republic had the most days (84) as the only country experiencing an extreme bottom
return for the Non-euro group and once more had the most days (95) with extreme top returns.
3.2.2. News Flow, Web Attention and Extreme Returns
The graphical illustrations of the information variables during the Euro-crisis period along with
the bottom extreme returns count for the Euro-periphery group appear in Figure 815.
14Correlations with the extreme bottom returns (see Section 3.2.1) are significant and much higher than these of raw
returns.
15the two Abnormal Pessimism Counts (not presented) are very similar to the overall News Count (albeit at a smaller
scale)
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Insert Figure 8 here
There exists a correlation between the bottom extreme returns count of the Euro-periphery group
and the four News Flow factors during the Euro-crisis. “Spikes” of extreme bottom returns (or
“extreme bottom returns clustering”) notably in the periods April-June 2010 and May-December
2011 seem to be related to the evolution of the information variables.
In order to examine the effects of the information variables on the probability of extreme returns
of all three country groups, we consider a polychotomous variable, like Bae et al. (2003) and Boyson
et al. (2010). In the theory of multinomial logistic regression models, if Pi is the probability of an
event category i out of m possible categories, a multinomial distribution can be defined by
Pi = P (Yt = i|xj) = G(β
′
ixj)
1 +
∑m−1
j=1 G(β
′
jxj)
, (5)
where x is the vector of covariates and βi the vector of coefficients associated with the covariates.
The function G(β′ix) many times takes the form of an exponential function exp(β
′
ix), in which case
Equation 5 represents a multinomial logistic (or multinomial logit) model.16 To capture the range of
possible outcomes, and yet have a concrete model, we have a total of six categories: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5
extreme returns. For a model that has only constants, m-1, or five parameters, need to be estimated.
But for every covariate added to the model, such as the daily SVI, five additional parameters need to
be estimated, one for each outcome. The top and the bottom extreme returns are estimated separately.
Finally, we compute the probability of an extreme return count of a specific level, Pi, by evaluating
the covariates at their unconditional values,
P ∗ij =
exp(β′ix
∗
j )
1 +
∑m−1
j=1 exp(β
′
jx
∗
j )
, (8)
where x∗j is the unconditional mean value of xj .
The coefficients that are given by a multinomial logistic regression compare the probability of a given
outcome with the base outcome (in our case the outcome 0 is the base outcome - i.e. the outcome
where no country has an extreme return). As mentioned in Greene (2003), the coefficients of such a
model are not easy to interpret.17 In multinomial logistic regressions the coefficients correspond to
probabilities. Thus, these partial effects give us the marginal change in probability for a unit change in
16Such models are estimated using maximum likelihood, with the log-likelihood function for a sample of n observations
given by
logL =
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Iij logPij , (6)
where Iij is a binary variable that equals one if the ith observation falls in the jth category, and zero otherwise. Goodness-
of-fit in these models is measured using the pseudo−R2 approach of McFadden (1974) where the unrestricted (full model)
likelihood, LΩ, and restricted (constants only) likelihood, Lω, functions are compared:
pseudoR2 = 1− [logLω/logLΩ]. (7)
17This is why in these models it is necessary to differentiate 5 in order to obtain the partial effects of the covariates
on the probabilities
δij =
δPij
δβi
= Pij [xj −
J∑
k=0
Pikβk] = Pij [βj − β¯] (9)
where β¯ =
J∑
k=0
Pikβk, the weighted average of every subvector of β.
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the independent covariate. In such models we are interested in seeing whether these marginal effects
are statistically significant or not.18
Yt counts the number of extreme returns and takes the value i when i stock market indices have
extreme returns (top or bottom) on day t. Yt is calculated separately for the Euro-core, the Euro-
periphery, and the Non-euro groups. Then, in Equation 8, Pi is equal to P (Yt = i|xt) where Yt =
0, 1, 2, ...k is the extreme returns count variable that is created for the Non-euro, Euro-periphery and
Euro-core respectively. So, we have k=5 for all three country groups, where xt is the explanatory
variable (covariate), on day t. In Equation 8, the argument of the exponential part (representing the
logistic function) is a function of the covariate (xt) and the coefficient (the beta). This function is a
linear expression of the arguments. Let’s call it gi(t). We will use this function to study the effect of
information variables on stock returns. For each group, the (daily) stock returns are calculated as the
equally weighted average of the stock returns of the countries that belong in each respective group.
4. Empirical Findings
4.1. News Flow, Web Attention and Extreme Returns
In equation 5, the dependent variable is the number of bottom (or top) extreme returns for one of
the three country groups while the independent variable is each one of the information variables for
the Euro-periphery group. Thus, the logistic regression G(β′ix) = exp(gi(xt)) of equation 5 has the
following form for gi(xt):
gi(xt) = b0i + b1iXit (11)
where i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 for each country group, the extreme returns count for the group. Xit takes
the values of the six information variables we calculated earlier. The results for the effect of the
information variables on extreme returns during the Euro-crisis appear in Table 7.
Insert Table 7 here
One can see that the Web Attention is the most significant variable for all three groups (in terms
of the highest R2). The Weighted Pessimism is the next most significant (see R2). These two vari-
ables seem to be the most relevant for extreme returns during the crisis. For the Euro-periphery
group, an increase of one in the Euro-periphery Web Attention increases the probability of all five
countries having bottom extreme returns in the same day by 0.2%, while an increase of 1% in the
18These marginal effects may even have different signs than the corresponding coefficients, since the derivative
δPij
βik
can have a different sign than the coefficient βjk. To elaborate a little further on why it is crucial that marginal effects
are calculated for such models, it is known that the coefficients of a multinomial logistic are obtained from comparing
the probability of a given outcome with the base outcome. In our case, the outcome is 0, in other words, no extreme
returns in the group. Thus, the estimated coefficient for covariate x13 for outcome 3, which is β13 and is the coefficient for
the 1st covariate, calculated for the 3rd outcome, measures the probability of having an outcome equal to 3 (3 extreme
returns in the group), instead of an outcome 0 (no extreme returns in the group), for a unit change in the covariate x13.
But in reality, there is also the possibility of having the outcome 2 instead of 0 for a unit change in covariate x13. This
is exactly why we need the marginal effects, to calculate the probabilities associated with a unitary covariate change in
adjacent categories, and not taking as an alternative only the base outcome (0 in our study). This happens because the
coefficients of a multinomial logistic regression model exhibit what is known as the “log odds ratio” property:
ln
Pij
Pi0
= β′ixj (10)
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Euro-periphery Weighted Pessimism increases the probability of this outcome by 1.4%. For the Non-
euro group, an increase of one in the Euro-periphery Web Attention increases the probability of all
five countries having bottom extreme returns in the same day by 0.2%, while an increase of 1% in the
Euro-periphery Weighted Pessimism increases the probability of this outcome by 1.3%. An increase
in the Euro-periphery Web Attention is associated with an increase in the probability of all five Euro-
core countries having extreme bottom returns on the same day by 0.5%, and an increase of 1% in the
Euro-periphery Weighted Pessimism increases the probability of this outcome by 2.9%.
The summary results for the three periods and for all the information variables appear in Table 8.
Insert Table 8 here
Each row of this table contains a separate model specification. In other words, a separate model
is estimated with Pessimism as the independent variable, another with Weighted Pessimism as the
independent variable et cetera. The symbol ”+” denotes a positive statistical significant effect. The
number of ”+” denotes the number of statistical significant coefficients. As we see in Table 8, for the
Pre-crisis period there is no effect for all three country groups and all variables.
During the US-crisis, we see significant effects mostly for the Euro-periphery and the Non-euro
groups for the bottom extreme returns. The fact that the coefficients are positive, means that an
increase in the variables increases the probabilities of the underlying outcomes. We also see a few
significant coefficients for the top extreme returns for the Pessimism and the Weighted Pessimism
(mainly for the Euro-core and Non-euro groups). In a turbulent period, it should be expected that
extreme bottom return days are followed by extreme top return days, and vice versa, because of higher
uncertainty. Even during the US-crisis, the effects for Euro-periphery are much more significant for
the bottom than for the top extreme returns (14 significant coefficients for the bottom returns versus
3 significant coefficients for the top returns), while for the Non-euro and the Euro-core the image is
more mixed.
The effects on bottom extreme returns are stronger for the Euro-crisis period. We notice effects
for all three groups and all variables. The marginal effects are positive, which means that a higher
value in any of the information variables is associated with higher probabilities of extreme bottom
returns in the groups’ stock markets. Thus, the Euro-periphery information variables do not only
affect the probabilities of extreme bottom returns for the Euro-periphery group, but also for the Non-
euro and the Euro-core groups. Finally, the Web Attention, for which daily data exist only for the
Euro-crisis period), exhibits significant and positive marginal effects for twelve out of fifteen bottom
extreme returns. In other words, more Web Attention for the Euro-periphery during the Euro-crisis
is associated with higher probabilities of extreme returns for all three groups we studied. The effect
on the probabilities of top returns is insignificant for most of the cases.
These results bring some useful implications for investors and policymakers: The quantity of news,
the tone of news and the Web Attention are closely related with the probabilities of extreme returns
(especially in times of crisis). We find that these effects are not only contained within the borders
of the group that the news or the Web Attention metrics concern (the Euro-periphery group), but
they also spread out across groups. For all three groups the probabilities of extreme bottom returns
are affected in a positive way (e.g. more pessimistic news about the periphery are associated with
higher probabilities of extreme returns for the other groups). Based on these results, one can argue
in favor of “transmission” or “propagation” of News Pessimism and of Web Attention (SVI) across
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groups during crisis times. Thus it might be useful for investors and policymakers to be aware of these
dynamics and effects when making investment or policy decisions.
5. Robustness and alternative specifications
To verify the robustness of our results, as a first robustness check, instead of 10% and 90% ex-
treme returns cutoffs, we used the 5% and 95% percentages. The results are robust in this change.
Furthermore as a second robustness check, instead of the raw returns, we calculated extreme returns
on the standardized residuals of a GARCH(1,1) model, accounting for the time-varying volatility ef-
fects, since in periods of high volatility, extreme returns are more probable. In order to calculate the
volatility, we move in line with Christiansen and Ranaldo (2009), estimating a AR(1)-GARCH(1,1)
model for each group’s average returns:
Retgroupt = c0 + c1Ret
group
t−1 + t (12)
where t N(0, σ
2
t ) and the variance follows a GARCH(1,1) process:
σ2t = c2 + c3σ
2
t−1 + c4
2
t−1 (13)
As far as the Google Trends Web Attention (SVI) robustness checks are concerned, apart from
the average Euro-periphery Web Attention (SVI), we also calculated the scaled Web Attention (SVI)
for the Euro-periphery using the most searched query as a common scaling factor for all country Web
Attention (SVI) time series. Combining queries in Google Trends provides a common scaling factor for
all the time series (providing a unique maximum equal to 100), instead of scaling each one separately
to its own maximum of 100. The results were found to be robust.
Last but not least, on top of the multinomial logistic regressions, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regressions as well as quantile regressions verified that our results hold, finding a negative and statistical
coefficient (i.e. a higher Pessimism associated with negative stock returns) for the crises periods.
6. Conclusion
We use daily stock market data from January 2004 till March 2013 and 24,402 news articles from
seven major international news sources to examine whether six “information variables” related to the
Euro-periphery countries affect the probabilities of extreme stock returns in three groups of countries:
the Euro-periphery, the Euro-core and the major Non-euro (European Union -but not euro- countries.
We find evidence that the Euro-periphery information variables have a statistically significant and
positive effect on the probabilities of extreme returns not only for the Euro-periphery countries but
also for the Euro-core and the major European Union -but not euro- countries. The effect in the vast
majority of cases is stronger for the bottom extreme returns. The implications of the overall findings
are quite significant for investors who may want to diversify their portfolios and should be aware of the
stock indices movement dynamics and of how extreme shocks propagate from one group of countries
to the others, affecting their portfolios’ overall risk. Furthermore, these findings are useful for policy
makers who need to assess policy decision making in times of extreme shocks and uncertainty (such as
crisis times). Due to the high complexity of financial markets and the extremely high level of available
13
information from the press and the web, agents can incorporate information extracted from textual
analysis of news items and trends on the web that may be associated with the market movements.
Future research could study alternative data mining and textual analysis techniques in order to
further improve the quality of the information variables. On top of that, the effect of policy making
and textual analysis on official meetings and announcements (e.g. bailout announcements) could also
be a field of research for subsequent studies.
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Table 1: Number of news stories per country and source for the Pre-crisis, US-crisis and Euro-crisis
periods.
Pre-crisis: 1 January 2004 - 26 February 2007
Source Portugal Ireland Italy Greece Spain Total
Dow Jones Newswires 69 132 613 108 176 1098
Thomson Reuters 128 186 386 192 408 1300
Financial Times 8 28 80 0 125 241
The Wall Street Journal 4 5 28 4 14 55
The New York Times 0 9 13 1 4 27
The Telegraph 0 13 10 1 2 26
The Times 2 98 16 1 8 125
Total 211 471 1146 307 737 2972
US-crisis: 27 February 2007 - 7 December 2009
Dow Jones Newswires 67 190 371 151 223 1002
Thomson Reuters 58 251 247 194 462 1212
Financial Times 1 54 24 37 104 220
The Wall Street Journal 0 32 20 23 45 120
The New York Times 0 12 5 2 4 23
The Telegraph 21 14 5 2 13 55
The Times 0 98 3 1 10 112
Total 147 651 675 410 861 2644
Euro-crisis: 8 December 2009 - 13 March 2013
Dow Jones Newswires 310 658 497 4342 729 6536
Thomson Reuters 298 661 771 3786 1093 6609
Financial Times 99 177 182 1010 262 1730
The Wall Street Journal 84 178 148 1059 302 1771
The New York Times 15 32 61 355 69 532
The Telegraph 21 81 90 531 128 851
The Times 8 175 44 400 130 757
Total 935 1962 1793 11483 2713 18786
Note: Selected news are news that pass two filters: first, for each country the news item must include
the name of the country plus any of the following keywords (the two words must be next to each other):
crisis, debt, economy, deficit, default. For example, for Greece the first filter selects the news stories
containing any of the terms: “greek crisis”, “greek debt”, “greek economy”, “greek deficit”, “greek
default”; second, for each country, the news item must contain in it’s title a country keyword. For
example, for Greece the second filter selects the news that passed the first filter and that furthermore
contain any of the following terms in the title: “greece”, “greek”, “greeks”, “greece’s”, “hellas”,
“hellenic”. The same applies to all five Euro-periphery countries.
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Table 2: News Flow and Web Attention (SVI) Variables: Names, Symbols and Definitions
Variable Name Variable Symbol Variable Definition
Pessimism (%) Pt Average of the Euro-periphery News Pessimism factors.
Weighted Pessimism (%) WPt Weighted average of the Euro-periphery News Pessimism factors.
News Count Nt The number of news items that passed the crisis-related filters.
Abnormal Pessimism Count APt The number of news items that passed the crisis-related filters, and whose pessimism is
higher than the Pre-crisis average pessimism.
Abnormal Weighted Pessimism Count AWPt The number of news items that passed the crisis-related filters, and whose pessimism is
higher than the Pre-crisis weighted average pessimism.
Web Attention SV It A time series taking discrete values, from 0 to 100, based on the number of searches made
via the Google Search Engine for crisis-related queries, 0 means that the query was not
searched at all on time t, and a 100 means that it was most searched for in the given time
frame.
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Table 3: Euro-periphery News Flow and Web Attention (SVI): Descriptive Statistics
Pre-crisis (1/1/2004 - 26/2/2007)
(Euro-periphery) Pessimism (Pt %) Weighted Pessimism (WPt %) News Count (Nt) APt AWPt SVI
Mean 0.399 1.067 3.279 2.14 1.612 −
Std. Dev. 0.487 1.292 2.714 2.121 1.866 −
Minimum −0.903 -4.07 0 0 0 −
Maximum 3.302 6.707 19 15 15 −
US-crisis (27/2/2007 - 7/12/2009)
(Euro-periphery) Pessimism (Pt %) Weighted Pessimism (WPt %) News Count (Nt) APt AWPt SVI
Mean 0.706 1.694 3.594 2.909 2.43 −
Std. Dev. 0.690 1.323 3.117 2.726 2.39 −
Minimum −1.333 -2.913 0 0 0 −
Maximum 4.337 6.965 18 17 15 −
Euro-crisis (8/12/2009 - 13/3/2013)
(Euro-periphery) Pessimism (Pt %) Weighted Pessimism (WPt %) News Count (Nt) APt AWPt SVI
Mean 1.574 2.447 22.093 19.82 17.77 9.682
Std. Dev. 0.720 0.779 21.347 19.741 18.104 5.326
Minimum −0.104 −0.223 0 0 0 0
Maximum 3.729 5.371 192 179 161 58.4
APt = Abnormal Pessimism Count
AWPt = Abnormal Weighted Pessimism Count
SVI = Web Attention
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Table 4: Country Groups Stock Indices: Descriptive Statistics
Pre-crisis US-crisis Euro-crisis
1/1/2004 - 26/2/2007 27/2/2007 - 7/12/2009 8/12/2009 - 13/3/2013
Non-euro Euro-periphery Euro-core Non-euro Euro-periphery Euro-core Non-euro Euro-periphery Euro-core
Mean (%) 0.101 0.089 0.081 −0.024 −0.074 −0.049 0.030 −0.016 0.03
Median (%) 0.142 0.104 0.108 0.013 0.008 0.013 0.0544 0.015 0.052
Std. Dev. (%) 0.715 0.569 0.703 1.616 1.555 1.619 0.952 1.284 1.189
Minimum (%) −4.514 −3.405 −3.338 −8.809 −8.118 −7.618 −4.467 −4.929 −5.081
Maximum (%) 3.441 2.79 2.858 8.689 7.838 8.584 5.321 9.118 6.848
Note: European countries are split in three groups: the Euro-periphery countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain), the Euro-core countries
(Germany, France, Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium) and the European Union -non Euro- countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Sweden, UK, Denmark).
Country group log returns and standard deviations are calculated on the equally weighted mean portfolio of the country stock market daily returns for
each group.20
Fig. 1. Web Attention (SVI) for Greece.
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Fig. 2. Euro-periphery bottom extreme returns count, News Flow and Web Attention (SVI) factors
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Table 5: Euro-periphery Information variables and Stock Returns Correlation Matrices
Pre-crisis (1/1/2004 - 26/2/2007)
Pessimism Weighted Pessimism News Count APt AWPt SVI Euro-periphery Euro-core Non-euro
Pessimism 1.000
Weighted Pessimism 0.813 1.000
News Count 0.463 0.264 1.000
APt 0.644 0.510 0.873 1.000
AWPt 0.674 0.569 0.799 0.933 1.000
Web Attention (SVI) − − − − −
Euro-periphery return −0.002 −0.004 −0.020 −0.023 − 1.000
Euro-core return 0.006 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.009 − 0.869 1.000
Non-euro return 0.042 0.033 0.036 0.028 0.026 − 0.791 0.805 1.000
US-crisis (27/2/2007 - 7/12/2009)
Pessimism Weighted Pessimism News Count APt AWPt SVI Euro-periphery Euro-core Non-euro
Pessimism 1.000
Weighted Pessimism 0.761 1.000
News Count 0.589 0.309 1.000
APt 0.710 0.458 0.945 1.000
AWPt 0.772 0.540 0.878 0.952 1.000
Web Attention (SVI) − − − − −
Euro-periphery return −0.049 −0.011 −0.069 −0.077 −0.070 − 1.000
Euro-core return −0.038 0.008 −0.065 −0.068 −0.060 − 0.928 1.000
Non-euro return −0.022 −0.006 −0.055 −0.061 −0.056 − 0.919 0.912 1.000
Euro-crisis (8/12/2009 - 13/3/2013)
Pessimism Weighted Pessimism News Count APt AWPt SVI Euro-periphery Euro-core Non-euro
Pessimism 1.000
Weighted Pessimism 0.614 1.000
News Count 0.296 0.205 1.000
APt 0.317 0.250 0.994 1.000
AWPt 0.337 0.289 0.985 0.994 1.000
Web Attention (SVI) 0.309 0.252 0.568 0.578 0.587 1.000
Euro-periphery return −0.079 −0.086 −0.048 −0.055 −0.068 −0.142 1.000
Euro-core return −0.061 −0.060 −0.047 −0.052 −0.062 −0.130 0.876 1.000
Non-euro return −0.047 −0.053 −0.040 −0.044 −0.054 −0.139 0.836 0.926 1.000
Note: APt=Abnormal Pessimism Count, AWPt=Abnormal Weighted Pessimism Count.
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Table 6: Count of bottom and top extreme daily log returns for country groups’ stock indices, January
1st 2004 to March 13th 2013.
Mean return (%)
when i = 5
Number of bottom extreme returns Number of top extreme returns Mean return (%)
when i = 5
5 4 3 2 1 0 0 1 2 3 4 5
Non-euro
POL −3.446 55 41 38 49 57 1847 1783 82 47 40 43 28 3.653
SWE −3.727 55 45 54 54 32 1847 1783 42 56 61 53 28 4.025
CZE −3.828 55 27 28 46 84 1847 1783 95 57 31 29 28 4.022
UK −3.241 55 52 60 43 30 1847 1783 37 56 62 57 28 3.572
DEN −3.370 55 47 48 42 48 1847 1783 61 42 55 54 28 3.382
Subtotal 55 53 76 117 251 1847 1783 317 129 83 59 28
Euro-
periphery
POR −3.253 54 66 44 39 37 1859 1817 61 45 34 60 40 3.008
IRE −3.944 54 54 26 50 56 1859 1817 69 47 31 53 40 3.522
ITA −3.636 54 69 45 52 20 1859 1817 20 62 56 62 40 3.678
GRE −4.160 54 35 22 23 106 1859 1817 108 32 20 40 40 4.200
SPA −3.503 54 64 49 44 29 1859 1817 29 56 54 61 40 3.652
Subtotal 54 72 62 104 248 1859 1817 287 121 65 69 40
Euro-core
GER −2.855 109 44 32 19 36 1970 1938 46 25 31 47 91 2.530
FRA −3.137 109 56 46 19 10 1970 1938 13 35 41 60 91 2.842
NL −3.169 109 51 37 22 21 1970 1938 20 27 50 52 91 2.782
FIN −3.303 109 38 24 19 50 1970 1938 48 26 26 49 91 3.240
BEL −2.809 109 35 32 27 37 1970 1938 51 29 29 40 91 2.534
Subtotal 109 56 57 53 154 1970 1938 178 71 59 62 91
Note: Extreme returns for daily stock index top (bottom) log returns are the ones belonging to the
highest (lowest) 10% of all daily returns. The extreme returns count is defined as the joint occurrence
of extreme returns (bottom or top) across different country indexes on the same day. For example,
out of a total sample of 2399 trading days, there are 104 occurrences of bottom extreme returns for
the Euro-periphery countries with 2 countries only, and in 23 of those days Greece is the one of the
two countries with bottom extreme returns.
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Table 7: The Euro-periphery information variables and the bottom extreme returns count of the three country groups for the Euro-crisis period.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Margin / SE Margin / SE Margin / SE Margin / SE Margin / SE Pseudo−R2
To Non-euro
Pessimism -0.014 0.001 0.012** 0.015** 0.013*** 0.010
Weighted Pessimism -0.020 0.013 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.018
News count 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.000* 0.000** 0.013
Abnormal Pessimism Count 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.014
Abnormal Weighted Pessimism Count 0.000 0.001* 0.001*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.017
Web Attention (SVI) 0.002 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.045
To Euro-core
Pessimism 0.013 0.011* -0.008 0.003 0.032*** 0.016
Weighted Pessimism 0.019* 0.009 0.008** 0.010 0.029*** 0.019
News count 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000 0.001** 0.014
Abnormal Pessimism Count 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000 0.001** 0.012
Abnormal Weighted Pessimism Count 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.014
Web Attention (SVI) -0.001 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.005*** 0.044
To Euro-periphery
Pessimism 0.021 -0.003 0.016*** 0.015** 0.015*** 0.018
Weighted Pessimism 0.023* 0.015 0.016*** 0.014** 0.014*** 0.019
News count 0.001** 0.000 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.014
Abnormal Pessimism Count 0.001** 0.000 0.000** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.015
Abnormal Weighted Pessimism Count 0.001** 0.000 0.000** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.017
Web Attention (SVI) 0.004* 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.045
Note: Columns (1) to (5) correspond to bottom extreme returns count (1 to 5). In other words, column (1) presents the marginal effects in the case of
one bottom extreme return for the respective group, and columns (2),(3),(4),(5) correspond to two, three, four and five bottom extreme returns for this
group. The value of 0.012 for the Non-euro Bottom Extreme Returns Count (column 3) means that an increase of one percent in the Pessimism increases
the probability of three Non-euro countries having extreme bottom stock returns (i.e. three bottom Euro-core extreme return) by 1.2%. (***), (**), (*)
: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
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Table 8: The Euro-periphery information variables and extreme returns: Summary results.
Bottom tail Top tail
Non-euro Euro-core Euro-Periphery Non-euro Euro-core Euro-Periphery
Pre-crisis (1/1/2004 - 26/2/2007)
Pessimism + −
Weighted Pessimism
News Count
Abnormal Pessimism Count −− + −
Abnormal Weighted Pessimism Count −
US-crisis (27/2/2007 - 7/12/2009)
Pessimism ++ + + + + + + + + + ++ +
Weighted Pessimism + + ++ + + + ++ +
News Count ++ + ++ ++
Abnormal Pessimism Count ++ + + + + + +
Abnormal Weighted Pessimism Count ++ + + + ++ ++ + +
Euro-crisis (8/12/2009 - 13/3/2013)
Pessimism +++ ++ + + + + + ++
Weighted Pessimism + + + + + + + + ++ ++ ++ +
News Count + + + + + + + + ++ + + +− +
Web Attention (SVI) + + ++ + + ++ + + + + + + +
Abnormal Pessimism Count + + + + + + + + ++ + + +− +
Abnormal Weighted Pessimism Count + + ++ + + + + + ++ + + +− +
Note: The number of “+” (or “-”) indicate the number of statistically significant (in the 1%, 5% or 10% levels) and positive (or negative) marginal
effects. For the bottom tail and the Euro-crisis period, three out of five Euro-periphery periphery Weighted Pessimism marginal effects were found to
be significant and positive for the Non-euro group, i.e. an increase of one percent in the periphery News Pessimism increases the probability of extreme
bottom returns for the Non-euro group in three out of five bottom extreme returns counts. The grey area corresponds to the results of Table 7
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Table 9: Markov switching model. Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Regime 1
Estimate Std. Error t value p rvalue
(Intercept)(S) 1.5307 0.0576 26.5747 <2e− 16∗∗∗
Average Pessimism 0.0302 0.0278 1.0863 0.2773
Multiple R-squared: 0.004526
Regime 2
Estimate Std. Error t value p value
(Intercept)(S) 0.9438 0.0169 55.8462 < 2.2e− 16∗∗∗
Average Pessimism 0.0327 0.0093 3.5161 0.0004379∗∗∗
Multiple R-squared: 0.02455
Transition probabilities:
Regime 1 Regime 2
Regime 1 0.97644897 0.01563271
Regime 2 0.02355103 0.98436729
Fig. 3. High/Low Volatility Regimes for Euro-periphery Volatility
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Table 10: Markov switching model. Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Regime 1
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(¿—t—)
(Intercept)(S) 0.8607 0.0212 40.5991 ¡ 2.2e-16 ***
Weighted Average Pessimism 0.0589 0.0084 7.0119 2.351e-12 ***
Multiple R-squared: 0.09475
Regime 2
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(¿—t—)
(Intercept)(S) 1.3710 0.0830 16.5181 ¡ 2.2e-16 ***
Weighted Average Pessimism 0.0823 0.0282 2.9184 0.003518 **
Multiple R-squared: 0.03117
Transition probabilities:
Regime 1 Regime 2
Regime 1 0.9840403 0.0252825
Regime 2 0.0159597 0.9747175
Fig. 4. High/Low Volatility Regimes for Euro-periphery Volatility
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Table 11: Markov switching model. Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Regime 1
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(¿—t—)
(Intercept)(S) 1.5742 0.0373 42.2038 ¡ 2e-16 ***
peripheryNewsCountEuroCrisis(S) 0.0015 0.0009 1.6667 0.09557 .
Multiple R-squared: 0.01039
Regime 2
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(¿—t—)
(Intercept)(S) 0.9530 0.0121 78.7603 ¡ 2.2e-16 ***
peripheryNewsCountEuroCrisis(S) 0.0025 0.0003 8.3333 ¡ 2.2e-16 ***
Multiple R-squared: 0.1063
Transition probabilities:
Regime 1 Regime 2
Regime 1 0.97479492 0.01476384
Regime 2 0.02520508 0.98523616
Fig. 5. High/Low Volatility Regimes for Euro-periphery Volatility
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Table 12: Markov switching model. Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Regime 1
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(¿—t—)
(Intercept)(S) 1.5712 0.0367 42.812 ¡ 2e-16 ***
pessimisticCountGtAveraEuCrisis(S) 0.0018 0.0010 1.800 0.07186 .
Multiple R-squared: 0.01289
Regime 2
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(¿—t—)
(Intercept)(S) 0.9515 0.0116 82.026 ¡ 2.2e-16 ***
pessimisticCountGtAveraEuCrisis(S) 0.0029 0.0004 7.250 4.168e-13 ***
Multiple R-squared: 0.1237
Transition probabilities:
Regime 1 Regime 2
Regime 1 0.97472112 0.01474346
Regime 2 0.02527888 0.98525654
Fig. 6. High/Low Volatility Regimes for Euro-periphery Volatility
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Table 13: Markov switching model. Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Regime 1
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(¿—t—)
(Intercept)(S) 1.5681 0.0371 42.2668 ¡ 2e-16 ***
pessimisticCountGtWeighEuCrisis(S) 0.0021 0.0011 1.9091 0.05625 .
Multiple R-squared: 0.01549
Regime 2
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(¿—t—)
(Intercept)(S) 0.9516 0.0115 82.748 ¡ 2.2e-16 ***
pessimisticCountGtWeighEuCrisis(S) 0.0032 0.0004 8.000 1.332e-15 ***
Multiple R-squared: 0.1314
Transition probabilities:
Regime 1 Regime 2
Regime 1 0.97468955 0.01474063
Regime 2 0.02531045 0.98525937
Fig. 7. High/Low Volatility Regimes for Euro-periphery Volatility
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Table 14: Markov switching model. Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Regime 1
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(¿—t—)
(Intercept)(S) 0.8655 0.0187 46.2834 ¡ 2.2e-16 ***
sviEuroPeripheryEuroCrisis(S) 0.0160 0.0019 8.4211 ¡ 2.2e-16 ***
Multiple R-squared: 0.1595
Regime 2
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(¿—t—)
(Intercept)(S) 1.4018 0.0413 33.9419 ¡ 2.2e-16 ***
sviEuroPeripheryEuroCrisis(S) 0.0181 0.0028 6.4643 1.018e-10 ***
Multiple R-squared: 0.1558
Transition probabilities:
Regime 1 Regime 2
Regime 1 0.98693811 0.02189085
Regime 2 0.01306189 0.97810915
Fig. 8. High/Low Volatility Regimes for Euro-periphery Volatility
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